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‘Remixing Rasmussen’: The Evolution of Accimaps within Systemic Accident 
Analysis 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Throughout Jens Rasmussen’s career there has been a continued emphasis on the 
development of methods, techniques and tools for accident analysis and 
investigation. In this paper we focus on the evolution and development of one 
specific example, namely Accimaps and their use for accident analysis. We describe 
the origins of Accimaps followed by a review of 26 studies which have applied and 
adapted Accimaps over the period 200-2015 to a range of domains and types of 
accident. Aside from demonstrating the versatility and popularity of the method, 
part of the motivation for the review of the use of Accimaps is to address the 
question of what constitutes a sound, usable, valid and reliable approach to systemic 
accident analysis. The findings from the review demonstrate continuity with the 
work carried out by Rasmussen, as well as significant variation (e.g., changes to the 
Accimap, used of additional theoretical and practice-oriented perspectives on 
safety). We conclude the paper with some speculations regarding future extension 
and adaptation of the Accimap approach including the possibility of using hybrid 
models for accident analysis. 
 
 
Keywords: Accident analysis and investigation, sociotechnical systems, Accimaps, 
organisational design, Jens Rasmussen. 
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1. Introduction  
During the 1980’s and 1990’s a series of high-profile accidents including Chernobyl 
(1986), Zeebrugge (1987), Challenger (1986) and Ladbroke Grove (1999) prompted 
researchers within the fields of human factors and safety science to move away from 
accounts of human error based solely around individual factors and to place more 
emphasis on the role played by human and organisational influences on safety. Hale 
and Hovden (1998) characterize the goals of what they termed the ‘third age’ of 
safety, as the achievement of a better understanding of the management issues, 
particularly in terms of safety ‘culture’ and ‘climate’ (Zohar, 1980; Antonsen, 
2009). This shift of emphasis from ‘micro’ to ‘macro’ accounts of error (Le Coze, 
submitted) is reflected in the types of methods for accident analysis and 
investigation which developed from the 1980’s up until the present day. These 
methods in themselves derive from a number of traditions including systems and 
macroergonomics (Hendrick and Kleiner, 2002; Wilson, 2014), safety engineering 
(Hollnagel, 2004) and cognitive systems engineering (Rasmussen, Pejtersen and 
Goodstein, 1994).  
 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
 
More recent developments such as the growth of the internet, social media and 
globalisation, have introduced new forms of systemic risk into complex 
sociotechnical systems (e.g., security, financial and environmental risks - Goldin 
and Mariathasan, 2014) and are reflected in a later generation of accident analysis 
tools and methods (e.g., Systems-Theoretic Accident Model (STAMP) – Leveson, 
2012; Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) – Hollnagel, 2012) which 
draw on sociotechnical systems theory, as well as the work which was conducted at 
the Risø Nuclear Plant by Jens Rasmussen and others from the late 1960’s up until 
2000  (figure 1). 
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1.1 Rasmussen and Systemic Accident Analysis (SAA) 
The work of Jens Rasmussen and his colleagues was very much at the forefront of 
the new view of error which emphasised the role played by organisational and wider 
environmental and political factors in accident causation. In a paper summarising a 
workshop held at the World Bank in October, 1988 to discuss risk management in 
the wake of the late 1980’s financial crisis (Rasmussen and Batstone, 1989), he 
emphasised the fact that technological and societal developments along with 
increasing competitive and commercial pressures on companies, had raised the 
potential for major accidents to occur. He also emphasised that part of the challenge 
involved in combating these pressures was the need for an expanded account of 
human behaviour which was sensitive to organisational and cultural context:  
 
“… the human factors specialists are challenged to expand their vision beyond the 
confines of human error and reliability analysis and to explore ways in which they 
could link with the cognitive, decision, systems and organizational specialists in 
developing risk profiles of organizational and management systems in different 
regulatory and cultural environments (page iii) … The rapid trend in the 
technological development now calls for a fresh view on risk management and 
safety control in large-scale hazardous systems (p. 39)… (Rasmussen and Batstone, 
1989). 
 
 
This emphasis was repeated a number of times in subsequent publications in the 
1990’s, for example, in the much cited paper which introduced the risk management 
framework (Rasmussen, 1997). The paper also included Rasmussen’s dynamic 
model of safety, the purpose of which was to demonstrate how economic 
considerations and workload pressures can move the system away from safe 
performance and closer to the margin of error (figure 2): 
 
“We need more studies of the vertical interaction among levels of socio-technical 
systems with reference to the nature of the technological hazard they are assumed to 
control.” (Rasmussen 1997, p. 187). 
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Figure 2 about here 
 
 
 
These ideas were incorporated into the Accimap method which was subsequently 
developed by Rasmussen and Inge Svedung in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s 
(Rasmussen, 1997; Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000; Svedung and Rasmussen, 2000). 
Accimaps attempt to model the dynamic interaction between multiple sociotechnical 
levels (regulatory, organisational, workplace) and account for the role these play in 
shaping the course of an accident as it happens over time. The use of Accimaps to 
provide insight into accidents and human error has grown in the last few years and a 
number of papers have applied the method to a wide variety of safety domains (e.g., 
public health – Vicente and Christoffersen, 2006; oil and gas industries – Hopkins, 
2000; aerospace – Johnson and de Almeida, 2008).  Figure 3 (a) shows a graph of 
the number of citations of Rasmussen (1997) starting form the first year in which it 
received a citation (2000). Figure 3 (b) shows a similar graph of citations for 
Rasmussen and Svedung (2000).  Recent interest in Accimaps and other aspects of 
Rasmussen’s approach to safety and risk management is demonstrated by the fact 
that in 2014 the 1997 paper received its highest number of citations relative to other 
years (n=84). Aside from the academic community, Accimaps are also used for 
accident analysis and human factors training within a number of organisational 
contexts (e.g., the UK’s Rail Safety and Standards Board, Royal Australian Air 
Force – Branford, 2010). 
 
 
Figures 3 (a) and (b) about here 
 
 
 
1.2 Aims and objectives of the paper 
In this paper we consider the how Accimaps and their use have evolved over the last 
decade and a half and how they have been used by other researchers. The paper 
partly came about as the result of the authors using Accimaps in order to analyse 
safety across a variety of different application areas (e.g., Healthcare, Policing and 
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Transport). Another aim was to provide details of part of the later period of 
Rasmussen’s career (following on from other accounts which focus on his early 
work – e.g., Green, 1988; Sanderson and Harwood, 1988; Vicente, 2001). The 
specific objectives of the paper are:  
 
 To carry out a review of studies which have used Accimaps for systemic 
accident analysis over the period 2000-2015 and is based on a framework which 
considers aspects of the theoretical and practical of using Accimaps (e.g.,  
theoretical background to the study, aspects of the procedure used to build the 
Accimap; changes to the original format of the Accimap);  
 To consider the outcomes from the review in terms of what it illustrates about 
the theory and practice of Systemic Accident Analysis (SAA) and the legacy of 
Jens Rasmussen. 
 
 
2. The origins of the Accimap 
In this section we first describe the format and content of the original version of the 
Accimap as outlined in Rasmussen (1997) and Svedung and Rasmussen (2000).  We 
trace back the origins to two components or ‘building blocks’ from earlier work 
namely the ‘abstraction hierarchy’ and ’decision ladder‘and the influence of ideas 
from control theory and engineering.  
 
2.1 Accimap format and content 
Accimaps typically focus on failures across six levels of analysis: government 
policy and budgeting; regulatory bodies and associations; local area government 
planning & budgeting (including company management, technical and operational 
management); physical processes and actor activities; and equipment and 
surroundings. According to Rasmussen (1997) each systemic level is involved in 
safety management via the control of hazardous processes through laws, rules, and 
instructions. For systems to function safely decisions made at high levels should 
promulgate down and be reflected in the decisions and actions occurring at lower 
levels of the system. Conversely, information at the lower levels (e.g. staff, work, 
equipment) regarding the system’s status needs to transfer up the hierarchy to 
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inform the decisions and actions occurring at the higher levels. Without this so 
called ‘vertical integration’, systems can lose control of the processes that they are 
designed to control (Cassano-Piche et al., 2009). Rasmussen (1997) argues that 
accidents are typically ‘waiting for release’ (p. 190); the stage being set by the 
routine work practices of various actors working within the system. Normal 
variation in behaviour then serves to release accidents. The risk management 
framework and Accimap method are shown in Figures 4 and 5. 
 
 
 
Figures 4 and 5 about here 
 
 
It is worthwhile noting that Rasmussen (1997; Svedung and Rasmussen, 2000) 
describe a set of sub-components within the overall Accimap – the Actormap, 
Infomap and Conflict Map). Actormaps provide ‘a layout of the decision-makers, 
planners, and actors who have been involved in the preparation of accidental 
conditions’ (Svedung and Rasmussen, 2000, p. 18). The intention behind Infomaps 
is to show lines of strong and weak communication within an organization. Finally, 
Conflict Maps illustrate potential conflicts and tensions between actors that might 
have contributed to the preconditions for the incident (de Almeida and Johnson, 
2008). 
 
2.2 Accimaps, the ‘abstraction hierarchy’ and ‘decision ladder’ 
Looking through the publications and reports produced by Rasmussen dating back 
to 1968 provides a number of insights into the origins and subsequent development 
of Accimaps. As Cook (2014) points out, Rasmussen was a very visual thinker 
whose work was shaped by his training in electronics and engineering (see also 
Vicente, 2001 for an explanation of Rasmussen’s background on his subsequent 
work on human error). The various papers and Risø reports produced by Rasmussen 
and colleagues are frequently illustrated by a variety of engineering diagrams, 
drawings and other graphical material. Some of this material shows signs of some of 
earliest stages in the development of the risk management framework and 
Accimaps. Figure 6 for example is an early attempt (1974) to describe the 
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‘abstraction hierarchy’ (Rasmussen and Vicente, 1989) or ‘decision ladder’ 
(Rasmussen, 1986). Each successive rung in the ladder represents the mental 
operations of the operator as they move from assessing the current system state 
(e.g., a control room interface) towards the target state to be achieved. A similar 
hierarchy (figure 7) is described in another paper (Rasmussen, 1987) where the 
focus is on the interaction between physiological and psychological factors and their 
combined role in contributing toward human error. In comparing figures 6 and 7 it 
seems not unreasonable to speculate that Rasmussen was gradually shifting the 
emphasis in his work on human error further ‘upwards’ in the hierarchy and moving 
toward an account of the influence of managerial and wider organisational factors in 
accident causation. A movement that was taken further and integrated into his work 
on the risk management framework and Accimaps through the inclusion of political, 
economic and regulatory factors (figure 4). 
 
 
Figures 6 and 7 about here 
 
 
 
2.3 The influence of control theory 
Rasmussen’s work involved consulting a wide range of sources and evidence of 
reading across a large range of disciplines within the physical, engineering and 
social sciences. Le Coze (submitted) similarly argues that much of his work 
demonstrated the influence of thinking based on cybernetics and the work of 
Norbert Wiener and William Ross Ashby amongst others (e.g., mechanisms for 
system feedforward and feedback). Leveson (submitted) also points to the influence 
of control theory on his research from the 1960’s onwards.  The Accimap was 
designed to take a control theory-based systems thinking approach to accident 
analysis. Consequently, accidents are considered to result from the loss of control 
over potentially harmful physical processes. According to Rasmussen (1997), every 
organisational level in a system affects the control of these hazards and a vertically 
integrated view of system behaviour is required. The dynamic nature of socio-
technical systems means that an accident is likely to be prepared over time by the 
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normal efforts of many individuals throughout a system and that a normal variation 
in somebody’s behaviour can ‘release’ an accident: 
 
“The propagation of an accidental course of events is shaped by the activity of 
people that either can trigger an accidental flow of events or divert a normal flow. 
Safety, then, depends on the control of work processes so as to avoid accidental side 
effects causing harm to people, environment, or investment“(Rasmussen and 
Svedung, 2000, p.9) 
 
Figure 8 (Rasmussen, 1968) shows an example of the use of a box and arrow 
diagram to describe the interaction between the operator and the instrumentation 
within a process plant. Similarly, figure 9 (Rasmussen, 1980) illustrates a model of 
the human operator in a control system which incorporates more sophisticated 
aspects of the information processing. It is interesting to draw parallels between 
these box-model control flow diagrams and the arrangement of causal factors, 
preconditions and consequences which contribute towards an accident and make up 
part of the Accimap diagram (figure 4). Rasmussen’s earlier work within control 
theory and the abstraction hierarchy/decision ladder appear to be integrated in 
subsequent research and accident analysis in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. 
 
 
Figures 8 and 9 about here 
 
 
 
3. Recent research using Accimaps 
3.1 Search strategy 
In order to identify recent studies which have used Accimaps to analyse large-scale, 
complex accidents, we adopted a strategy of working backwards from the scientific 
published literature (e.g., within bibliometric databases), as well as looking at 
articles citing the original publications and reports by Rasmussen which relate to 
Accimaps (i.e., Rasmussen, 1997; Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000; Svedung and 
Rasmussen, 2002). The search covered the period 2000-2015 and was conducted in 
June 2015. A final method of locating studies was to compare our own personal lists 
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of studies and to discuss our literature amongst ourselves (all four authors have been 
active Accimap users over the last few years). We also contacted and gathered 
information from other researchers who had used and published papers in the last 
decade or so. Four databases were searched using the term ‘Accimap*’ and 
variations of the form of the word (e.g., AcciMap, ACCIMAP), these were: the ISI 
Web of Science; Google Scholar, Ergonomics Abstracts and PsycINFO. 
 
3.2 A framework for analysing and comparing the use of Accimaps 
In order to cover both the theoretical implications of using Accimaps and details of 
practical concerns (e.g., how they were constructed), we used 10 separate categories 
in order to compare studies, these covered: the context in which the Accimap was 
used (e.g., healthcare, transport, aviation); the goals and objectives of the study 
(e.g., providing a systemic account of the factors contributing to the accident); the 
theoretical background of the study (e.g., sociotechnical systems theory); the 
procedure described in building the Accimap (e.g., use of two or more analysts; use 
of thematic coding or other qualitative data analysis methods); the outcomes from 
the analysis (e.g., type of Accimap); comparisons with other models (e.g., with 
HFACS, STAMP); levels of analysis (i.e., number and type of levels used); casual 
factors (i.e., number); changes to the standard Accimap (i.e., major/minor deviations 
from the format of the Accimaps described in Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000); and, 
other details (i.e., any other noteworthy or idiosyncratic features of the analysis). 
 
4. Findings  
4.1 Recent research using Accimaps 
Table 1 shows the results of searching though the four databases. We removed 
duplicates and studies which did not report in details using Accimaps to carry out an 
analysis of an accident (e.g., Branford et al., 2009 where guidelines for the use of 
Accimaps are described; Salmon et al., 2012 where a high-level illustration of the 
application of Accimaps to road transport is presented) and studies which reported 
using the Accimap in two or more publications (e.g., in a journal article and 
conference presentation). The final sample comprised 26 studies. Table 2 lists the 
authors and titles of these studies. Appendix 1 contains a list of the studies and their 
publication details. 
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Tables 1 and 2 about here 
 
 
4.2 Applying the framework 
Table 3 is a summary of the results of applying the framework described in section 
3.2 to the 26 studies. In subsequent sections (4.2.1 to 4.2.5) of the paper, we refer to 
individual studies with reference to their numbering in table 2 (e.g., study 2 is Woo 
and Vicente, 2005). 
 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
 
4.2.1 Context of use 
A total of 10 separate domains are covered by the studies: Manufacturing (12); 
Nuclear (13); Aviation and Aerospace (5, 14, 16, 21 and 23) ; Emergency Response 
(22); Civil Engineering (25); Oil and Gas (1, 24); Public Health (2, 6, and 7); 
Transport (Rail – 3, 17, 18, 26 and Road – 21 and 26); Outdoor Recreation (8, 9); 
and Policing and Security (10, 11). The most frequent use of Accimaps occurs in 
Aviation and Aerospace (5 studies), Transport (Rail – 4 studies), and Public Health 
(3 studies). 
 
4.2.2 Study goals and objectives and theoretical background 
Most of the papers stated that their overall goal was to analyse a complex 
sociotechnical system and understand the role played by a range of contributory 
factors in causing an accident to occur. Within this broad category, Accimaps were 
sometimes used to underline specific aspects and advantages of adopting and 
applying a systems approach towards accident analysis. For example, studies 
mentioned the value of Accimaps in terms of their ability to apply a ‘holistic’ (13), 
‘big picture’ (14), ‘system of systems’ (24) viewpoint or approach towards 
accidents. The use of a set of predictions set out by Rasmussen (1997) concerning 
the risk management framework (e.g., ‘Safety as an emergent property of a complex 
socio-technical system’) was employed in order to test the explanatory adequacy of 
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the framework for specific domains (e.g., Public Health – 4, 6; Policing and 
Security – 10; emergency response – 22; Accidents involving young drivers – 26).   
Other papers placed emphasis on the value of using Accimaps to probe deeper into 
the ‘causal networks’ (1), ‘interdependencies’ (10) and general system-wide failures 
(24) within complex sociotechnical systems. Accimaps were also used in order to 
highlight the role played by specific systemic features of accidents which are 
sometimes underplayed or neglected by other accident analysis techniques (e.g., 
organisational factors – 7, 16; the dynamic interplay between individual cognition, 
decision-making and motivation in accident scenarios – 10, 11, 16, and 26). Finally, 
a few studies compared the outcomes from an Accimap analysis with other accident 
analysis methods (e.g., Root Cause Analysis – 8; STAMP - 9, 18; Australian 
Transportation Safety Board (ATSB) Model – 18; HFACS – 9). 
 
The theoretical stance adopted by most studies corresponded to Rasmussen’s (1997; 
figure 2) model of the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable performance 
within sociotechnical systems. It is also clear that the studies drawn on a diverse 
range of disciplines and theoretical traditions in their use of Accimaps, these 
include: theory oriented around high reliability organisations (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007) – 1; Normal Accident Theory (Perrow, 1984 – 23); schema theory (Neisser, 
1976) - 10, 11 and 16; and, organisational sociology – 1 (Turner, 1978); as well as 
disciplines such as computer science and logic – 3, safety science and safety 
engineering – 5, 12, 24 and 25, and human factors, cognitive ergonomics and 
general engineering – 10, 11, 17, 13 and 20).  
 
4.2.3 Procedure and outcomes 
The relative unconstrained manner in which Accimaps are constructed has led a 
number of authors to raise questions concerning the reliability and validity of 
Accimaps (e.g., Johnson and de Almeida, 2008; Branford, 2007; Branford et al., 
2009; Waterson and Jenkins, 2010, 2011).  For this reason we examined the 
procedure which was used to construct Accimaps across the 26 studies (e.g., the use 
of coding to identify causal contributory factors; procedures for reviewing the 
Accimap). Just over half of the studies in the sample (15) did not provide details of 
the procedure that was used to construct the Accimap. The most common procedure 
followed was for one or more of the study authors to carry out an initial analysis of 
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the accident and then to present the Accimap for review by other co-authors or 
analysts (8, 9. 10, 11, 16, 17, 20, 22, 25). In other cases, subject matter or domain 
experts (e.g., outdoor activity instructors; experts in rail safety) reviewed the 
Accimaps and suggested some modifications and revisions (9, 16 and 22). In two 
studies, the method used for qualitative analysis was described in detail (e.g., 
thematic analysis – Braun and Clarke, 2006 – 24, 25). In other cases explicit detail 
was provided of the stages in which the Accimap was constructed (e.g., 7, 12).  
 
A range of different outcomes came about from using Accimaps. Some studies for 
example, use a combination of Accimap, Actormap and Conflict Map in order to 
describe the accident (2, 5 and 6). In other cases, the Accimap and Actormaps were 
used to capture causal factors, as well as possible countermeasures which could be 
put in place to prevent the accident happening again (18). Study 25 involved the use 
of an aggregate Accimap in order to summarise contributory factors leading to 
accidents involving young drivers, as well as possible countermeasures. A more 
common approach was to use the Accimap in combination with another method or 
accident model (e.g., Why-Because Analysis – Ladkin and Loer, 2008 – 3; Root 
Cause Analysis – 8; HFACS and STAMP – 9; the Swiss Cheese Model – 15). Many 
studies provided additional annotation or detail to the basic format of the Accimap 
(e.g., annotating causal and cross-level relationships – 7, 10; integrating a timeline 
with the Accimap – 10, 11, representing subsystems in a system-of-systems - 22), as 
well as using other techniques to provide additional analytical power to the accident 
analysis (e.g., the use of CWA – 11; Neisser’s perceptual cycle – 11, 16). In two 
studies, the Accimap was used as a basis with which to construct a new model or 
method (e.g., the AcciTree method which combines Accimaps with a taxonomy 
based on HFACS – 19; ‘Impromaps’ which focus on accidents caused by operator 
improvisation – 20). 
  
4.2.4 Levels of analysis, causal factors, changes and other details 
Most studies did not deviate from the standard six levels of analysis as described by 
Rasmussen (1997). Where there were variations, these tended to be in cases where 
there was a need to re-label the levels to fit a specific context or application domain 
(e.g., Hospital management – 7; pedestrian level – 29). The average number of 
Accimap casual factors described in the study sample, excluding Actormaps and 
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Conflict maps, was 38. The number of Accimap causal factors ranged from 7-71 
and reflects that some studies presented a simplified overview of the accident (e.g., 
1), whereas other went into more details and attempted to describe the complex 
interdependencies which existed between causal factors  (e.g., 10, 11). The number 
of causal factors and level of detail in the Accimap is related to the goals and 
objectives of the study (section 4.2.2) – some studies (e.g., 1) presenting an 
overview of the accident, whilst others (10, 11) providing a very detailed, minute-
by-minute account of how the accident unfolded across a range of stakeholders. 
Two studies added ‘fault trees’ or ‘logic gates’ to the Accimap (2 and 5), whilst 
other minor changes were made to the original format in order to accommodate 
testing of Rasmussen’s predictions (6, 8) and formulating a set of cross-level 
hypotheses (e.g., the interaction between organisational and group levels of analysis 
– Karsh et al., 2014, study 7). 
 
 
5. Discussion 
5.1 ‘Remixing Rasmussen’ 
The 26 studies in tables 2 and 3 share a great deal in common with the original 
formulation of the Accimap as set out by Rasmussen in the late 1990’s and early 
2000’s.  Many of them draw on the dynamic model of safety and system 
performance (figure 2), as well as other theoretical aspects of the risk management 
framework (e.g., testing the predictions set out by the framework). Most of the 
studies also preserve the core Accimap ‘building blocks’ (section 2; e.g., levels of 
analysis; layout of causal factors). However, there is also large variation across the 
studies and these provide some insights into the ways in which the various 
researchers have been inspired by Rasmussen’s work. Some of these variations 
might be said to reflect the way in which Rasmussen’s work on the Accimap has 
been ‘remixed’, reinterpreted and evolved over the last few decades. In this section 
we focus on two aspects of this evolution or ‘remixing’ process which relate to the 
theoretical and practical aspects of systemic accident analysis. 
 
5.1.1 Systemic accident analysis: ‘rhetorical’ aspects of Accimap usage and theory 
elaboration 
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All of the studies in the sample aimed to provide a systemic account of factors 
which contribute towards accidents. Part of this involves emphasising that accidents 
do not come about as a result of single failures, but are attributable to a range of 
causal factors distributed across various part of the larger system. Despite the 
popularity of this view amongst the research community, single-factor explanations 
often prevail (Dekker et al., 2011). Part of the motivation in using Accimaps might 
therefore be said to be rhetorical: the Accimap provides a means with which to 
counter this view and to act as a demonstration of the value of adopting a systems 
perspective on human error, particularly in domains where the ‘bad apply’ theory of 
accidents (Dekker, 2014; Jun et al., submitted) continues to persist (e.g., aviation – 
Holden, 2009; study 15). This is especially important in new areas of application 
where application of the system approach has little precedence (e.g., studies 2, 4, 6, 
7, 8, 10, 11, 21). In recent and as yet unpublished work, for example, we have used 
Accimaps as a means to demonstrate the complexity of accident causation in public 
safety (food safety) and maritime accidents (shipping collisions - Nayak and 
Waterson, in preparation; Murray et al., submitted). One of the reasons for doing 
this was to counter overly–reductionist, person-centred accounts of accident 
causation in these domains (see for example Pennington, 2003 for an account of 
how this applies within food safety).   
 
A second goal of systemic accident analysis is to probe deeper into inter-
relationships and causality across system levels. The use of Accimaps in study 11 
for example, alongside other elements of Rasmussen’s work (e.g., the decision 
ladder) attempted to integrate cognitive factors at the group level of analysis with a 
second set of factors related to individual decision-making. A similar desire to 
understand the causal inter-relationships between different levels of analysis was 
part of the motivation for using Accimaps in Waterson (2009, study 7). In this case, 
the analysis began as an attempt to underline the importance of the role of 
organisational factors in hospital infection control – one use of Accimaps which is 
common to a number of studies (e.g., 12 and 15). However, subsequent analysis 
using Accimaps facilitated the incorporation of theory drawn from organisational 
behaviour (in this case the co-called ‘meso-paradigm’ – House et al., 1995), 
alongside a set of multi-level hypotheses. The use of Accimaps in these and other 
studies, helped to clarify theoretical aspects of systemic accident analysis, as well as 
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identify gaps in our understanding of the relationship between micro and macro 
systems components. How far we can go with multi-causal explanations is the 
subject of some debate (e.g., Reason, 1999; Shorrock et al., 2004), however, it is 
clear that one ‘spin-off’ from the use of Accimaps is that they help the analyst to 
develop new insights into the complex causal inter-relationships involved in 
accidents.    
 
In general, an important characteristic of the evolution of Accimaps since their 
original formulation has been their use to elaborate and articulate new directions for 
theory within accident analysis.  Part of this has come about because Accimaps 
focus on providing a systemic overview, as well as an examination of causal inter-
relationships. The process of constructing the Accimap might be said to be akin to 
accident ‘sensemaking’ (Weick, 1995) in that understanding and mapping causal 
factors within the Accimap often involves unravelling, or at least hypothesising, 
relationships across and between a wide range of levels of analysis within the 
overall system in question. Working through the Accimap helps to resolve 
ambiguities, as well as identifying new hypotheses and areas for further 
investigation (e.g., links with individual cognition, motivation, group attitudes – 
studies, 10, 11, 16 and 26). Vaughan (1992, p.175-6) in her account of the process 
of understanding the causes of the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident describes a 
similar process in her description of what she calls ‘case analysis’: 
 
“Because of the different sorts of data available from micro- and macro-level 
analysis, choosing cases that vary both the unit of analysis and the level of analysis, 
when possible, can lead to the elaboration of theory that more fully merges micro- 
and macro- understandings. Third, this method can be particularly advantageous 
for elaborating theories, models, and concepts focusing on large, complex systems 
that are difficult to study”  
  
It might well be argued that this process of theory elaboration is common to all 
methods and model of accident analysis (figure 1). The key difference between 
these methods and models, however, is that in terms of procedure Accimaps are 
relatively unconstrained and are not intended to be used in a prescriptive, ‘top-
down’ manner. The freedom afforded by Accimaps allows the analyst to explore a 
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range of options for analysis and encourages experimentation and exploration of 
explanations which draw on the systems approach and systems theory. Rasmussen 
(1999, p. xi) made the following comment about Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) 
and much the same philosophy might be said to apply to Accimaps: 
 
“the CWA framework is not a prescriptive method … it is a point of view, a state of 
mind, and a demonstration of the various dimensions of the problem of analysing 
work performance in a dynamic society” 
 
5.1.2 Practical trade-offs: validity, reliability and utility 
The extent to which models, methods and tools for systemic accident analysis 
produce outcomes which are valid (e.g., the degree to which the Accimap analysis 
successfully identifies the causes of an accident) and reliable (e.g., the degree to 
which accident analysts produce similar Accimaps) are often viewed as an 
important criteria for judging their appropriateness for accident analysis.  For 
example, in discussing general human factors and ergonomics methods, Baber and 
Stanton (2002, p. 218) suggest that “there seems little point in employing a method 
that does not pass even the basic requirements of validity and reliability”. Likewise, 
Kanis (2014) argues that many methods in human factors and ergonomics fail to 
achieve acceptable levels of reliability and validity when used by both researchers 
and practitioners. More recently, Ryan (2015) included issues of reliability and 
validity in a list of eight requirements for methods for accident investigation and 
analysis. 
 
 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
 
 
Accimaps appear to meet the first seven requirements in table 4; however, across 
the 26 studies in the sample there are good reasons for questioning the degree to 
which they produce reliable and valid outcomes. The majority of studies for 
example, report very few details of how the Accimap was constructed. In other 
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cases, the use of multiple coders/analysts and validation with domain experts might 
provide some degree of confidence that a degree of reliability and validity can be 
achieved by following the right procedure. Branford (2007) has carried out a very 
the detailed set of studies of the reliability and validity of Accimaps. She concluded 
that Accimap analyses do not always correctly identify the causes of accidents or 
the most appropriate corrective actions to prevent their recurrence. In order partly to 
improve on the validity and reliability, Branford et al., (2009) produced a set of nine 
guidelines covering construction of the Accimap. These guidelines provide a set of 
steps and prompts for analysts and are a considerable improvement on the limited 
information available in Rasmussen (1997; Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000). 
 
Questions concerning the reliability and validity of human factors and accident 
analysis methods are often raised in conjunction with similar concerns about 
usability (i.e., how easy if the model, method etc. to use) and utility (how useful are 
the outcomes regardless of, for example, issues of validity and reliability).  In some 
ways, the chief virtue of the Accimap is that it is relatively easy to use. As one 
participant at the Rasmussen Legacy symposium held in 2014 at Risø commented: 
“it’s easy for practitioners to quickly get going with an Accimap, furthermore they 
understand it straight away”. The experience of the authors of this paper is that the 
graphical representations produced by Accimaps also make them very suitable for 
communicating with audiences from backgrounds and specialisms outside of human 
factors. This is reinforced by other research comparing various system accident 
analysis methods and models and assessing the degree to which safety specialists 
and other practitioners are met by current systemic accident methods and models 
(Underwood and Waterson, 2013, 2014, submitted). We note however, that there 
may also be drawbacks with regard to the use of graphical representations. 
Hollnagel (2004, 2004, pp. 123-124) for example, that accident analysis models 
such as Accimap are limited to the extent to which they can map multi-causal 
relationships since they rapidly become overly-complicated when too many casual 
factors are included (one possible reason, for example, why the average number of 
contributory causes in our sample is around 35-40 – section 4.2.4).  
 
In some respects questions centred on the reliability and validity of Accimaps may 
be missing the point. Accimaps are primarily used for the purpose of accident 
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analysis (e.g., understanding factors which caused the accident, suggesting 
countermeasures) and not investigation (e.g., finding a root cause or set of root 
causes). An analogy might be drawn with some observations made by Karl Weick 
on the trade-offs involved in developing theory within the social sciences (Weick, 
1979) and models and methods for accident analysis. Weick (drawing on earlier 
work by Thorngate, 1976) uses the metaphor of a clock face to argue that it is 
impossible for a theory of social behaviour to be simultaneously general, accurate 
and simple - two of these three characteristics may be possible, but not all three.  
Thus the more general and simple a theory, for example, the less accurate it will be 
in predicting specifics. Attempts to secure any two of the ‘virtues’ of a theory will 
mean that the third will be sacrificed. ‘Two o’clock theories’ for example, are 
general and accurate, but they will not be simple. This clock face analogy might 
well be usefully applied to tools, models and methods for accident analysis. 
Accimaps might be said to fit the category of a ‘two o’clock method (general and 
simple), but not necessarily accurate. 
 
5.1.3 Accimaps and SAA as ‘bricolage’ 
A final aspect of the ‘remixing’ process which has taken place in the last decade or 
so is the construction of new forms of Accimap, alongside combining components 
(e.g., error taxonomies – study 15, Swiss Cheese, study 19 - HFACS) from other 
methods and models in order to embellish or improve the outputs from Accimap 
analysis. The process of constructing these ‘hybrid’ versions of the original 
Accimap might be viewed as similar to what the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss 
(1962) called ‘bricolage’, that is ‘the construction [e.g., an artefact, narrative, tool] 
or creation from a diverse range of available things’ (Concise Oxford English 
Dictionary, 12th Edition, 2011). The process of bricolage is very much in keeping 
with the pragmatic approach taken by many of the 26 studies, and indeed might well 
have been Rasmussen’s original intention. Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) present a 
variety of Accimaps in their report, many of them with different components and 
with little guidance covering how to construct these. From this point of view 
articulating and exploring accidents, as well as demonstrating the value and merit of 
a systemic approach (section 5.1.3 above), may be more important than applying or 
being bound by strict criteria such as reliability and validity (section 5.1.2).  
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6. Summary and new directions 
Our review of the studies which have followed on from Jens Rasmussen’s in the late 
1990’s is testament to the influence his work has had on other researchers. 
Accimaps continue to evolve and Rasmussen’s work continues to be ‘remixed’. 
Rasmussen was a pioneer in the field of systemic accident analysis and can be 
considered as one of the most important founders of the approach. It is a fitting 
tribute to his work that the tradition of seeing to explain human error beyond 
individual boundaries has spawned so many followers in the last few decades. 
Moreover, his legacy has generated both theoretical and practice-oriented debates 
which are very much grounded within a tradition of research which Lintern (2012) 
described as work-focused analysis and design. Much of this contrasts with more 
recent attempts to develop what Dekker (2011) characterises as ‘Systems version 2’, 
where the emphasis is perhaps more on conceptual and theoretical description, 
rather than data-driven analysis and evaluation.  
 
A number of possible future directions for Accimaps are possible, many of which 
are already underway.  Firstly, there is much scope for the further development of 
‘hybrid’ accident models based on the basic Accimap format. Rather than develop 
new models, there is plenty of scope to ‘mix and match’ and ‘remix’ many of the 
model which already exist (Hovden et al., 2010; Le Coze, 2013).  The combination 
of the HFACS method and Accimaps for example, has already been undertaken by 
some studies (e.g., study 19), but this could be expanded, or at least experimented 
with (i.e., in keeping with the spirit of ‘bricolage described earlier). Accimaps might 
benefit from the support of the types of error taxonomic available in HFACS. 
Likewise, there is scope to develop additional categories of error to suit specific 
domains (e.g., rail transport) where the HFACS taxonomy may need to be tailored 
to specific needs and requirements and expanded. Secondly, the guidelines put 
forward by Branford et al., (2009) could be taken a step further. These might 
encompass recommendations covering the evaluation and validation of Accimap 
outputs (e.g., in the manner of some studies which have included these details in 
their procedure – studies 9, 16 and 22).  This sort of future work might help to 
improve reliability and validity and many, well-respected examples are discernible 
within the literature on qualitative data analysis (e.g., Corbin and Strauss, 2008), as 
well as accident analysis (e.g., Snook, 2000). Finally, understanding causality across 
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system levels represents a critical challenge for understanding risks to safety 
(Hettinger et al., 2015).  
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Figure 1: The development of methods for sociotechnical systems and safety (adapted from Waterson et al., 2015) 
 
Figure 2: Dynamic model of safety and system performance (Rasmussen, 1997) 
 
 
 
  
36 
Figure 3: (a) Citations of Rasmussen (1997) over the period 2000- June 2015; 
(b) Citations of Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) over the period 2000- June 
2015 
 
(a) 
 
 
 
(b) 
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Figure 4: The risk management framework (Rasmussen, 1997) 
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Figure 5: Accimap diagram format (adapted from Rasmussen and Svedung, 
2000, p. 21) 
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Figure 6: The operator’s ‘ladder of abstraction’ Rasmussen (1974) 
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Figure 7: Complex interaction in a man-machine system (Rasmussen, 1982) 
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Figure 8: Diagram of control system (Rasmussen, 1968) 
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Figure 9: Model of the human operator in a control system (Rasmussen, 1980) 
 
 
 
Table 1: Database search results 
Database Number of hits Articles describing use of 
Accimaps 
Web of Science 15 13 
Google Scholar 251 21 
Ergonomics 
Abstracts 
11 11 
PsycINFO 9 9 
 
Table 2: Study sample 
 Study Authors Study Title 
1 Hopkins (2000) Lessons From Longford: The Esso Gas Plant Explosion 
2 Woo and Vicente (2003) Sociotechnical systems, risk management, and public health: comparing the North Battleford and Walkerton outbreaks 
3 Ladkin (2005) Why-Because analysis of the Glenbrook, NSW rail accident and comparison with Hopkin’s AcciMap 
4 Vicente and Christophsen  (2006) The Walkerton  E. coli  outbreak: a test of Rasmussen’s framework for risk management in a dynamic society 
5 Johnson and de Almeida (2008) An investigation into the loss of the Brazilian space programme’s launch vehicle VLS-1 V03 
6 Cassano-Piche et al. (2009) A test of Rasmussen's risk management framework in the food safety domain: BSE in the UK 
7 Waterson (2009) A systems ergonomics analysis of the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells infection outbreaks 
8 Salmon et al. (2010) Systems-based accident analysis in the led outdoor activity domain: application and evaluation of a risk management framework 
9 Salmon et al. (2012) Systems-based analysis methods: a comparison of Accimap, HFACS and STAMP. 
10 Jenkins et al. (2010) A systemic approach to accident analysis: A case study of the Stockwell shooting. 
11 Jenkins et al. (2011) What could they have been thinking? How sociotechnical system design influences cognition: a case study of the Stockwell shooting 
12 Le Coze (2010) Accident in a French dynamite factory: An example of an organisational investigation 
13 Andersson (2010) Using Accimaps to describe the emergence of critical work situations – a systemic approach to analyse evaluation 
14 Branford (2011) Seeing the big picture of mishaps – applying the AcciMap approach to analyze system accidents 
15 Debrincat et al. (2013) Assessing organisational factors in aircraft accidents using a hybrid Reason and AcciMap model 
16 Salmon et al. (2013) The crash at Kerang: Investigating systemic and psychological factors leading to unintentional non-compliance at rail level crossings 
17 Underwood and Waterson (2014) Systems thinking, the Swiss Cheese model and accident analysis: a comparative systems analysis of the Grayrigg train derailment using the ATSB, 
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Table 2: Study sample 
 Study Authors Study Title 
Accimap and STAMP models 
18 Scott-Parker et al. (2014) The driver, the road, the rules … and the rest? A systems-based approach to young driver road safety 
19 Lei et al. (2014) An integrated graphic–taxonomic–associative approach to analyze human factors in aviation accidents 
20 Trotter et al. (2014) Impromaps: Applying Rasmussen’s Risk Management Framework to improvisation incidents 
21 Salmon et al. (2014) A systems approach to examining disaster response: Using Accimap to describe the factors influencing bushfire response 
22 Harvey and Stanton (2014) Safety in System-of-Systems: Ten key challenges 
23 Tabinzadeh and Meshkati (2015) Applying the AcciMap methodology to investigate a major accident in offshore drilling: a systematic risk management framework for oil and gas 
industry 
24 Fan et al. (2015) Analysis for Yangmingtan bridge collapse. 
25 Newman and Goode (2015) Do not blame the driver: a systems analysis of the causes of road freight crashes 
26 Stefanova et al. (2015) Systems-based approach to investigate unsafe pedestrian behaviour at level crossings 
Table 3: Applying the framework to the 26 studies 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Hopkins (2000) Woo and Vicente 
(2003) 
Ladkin (2005) Vicente and 
Christopherson 
(2006) 
Johnson and de 
Almeida (2008) 
Cassano-Piche et 
al. (2009) 
Waterson (2009) Salmon et al 
(2010) 
Salmon et al. 
(2012)  
Context of 
use 
Oil and Gas - 
Explosion at Esso 
Gas Plant in 
Longford, 
Australia resulting 
in 2 fatalities and 
widespread 
disruption 
Public Heath -
Comparison of two 
public health E. coli 
outbreaks in Canada 
(North Battleford and 
Walkerton) 
Rail – Glenbrook 
train collision 
(1999) 
Public Health – 
Walkerton  
E. coli outbreak 
Aerospace- 
Explosion of 
Brazilian Space 
Vehicle 
Public Health – UK 
1996 BSE (‘Mad 
Cow’ Disease) 
outbreak 
Public Health 
(Hospital) – 
Outbreaks of 
Clostridium 
difficile at 
Maidstone and 
Tunbridge Wells 
NHS Trust (2005-
2007) 
Outdoor 
Recreation – 
Lyme Bay 
Canoeing 
Incident (1993) 
Outdoor 
Recreation – 
Mangatepopo 
Gorge Incident 
(2008) 
Goals and 
objectives 
Attempt to lay out 
‘causal networks’ 
leading up to the 
explosion 
(Hopkins, 2000, p. 
120)  
Analysis of complex 
socio-technical 
factors contributing to 
outbreaks (emphasis 
on public policy and 
public health) 
Comparison with 
Accimap 
developed  by 
Hopkins (2005) 
Analysis of 
complex socio-
technical factors 
contributing to 
outbreaks 
(emphasis on 
public policy and 
public health) 
Analysis of 
complex socio-
technical factors 
contributing to the 
explosion and how 
this developed over 
time. Comparison 
with STAMP 
analysis (Leveson, 
2003) 
Analysis of 
complex socio-
technical factors 
contributing to 
outbreaks 
(emphasis on role 
played by food 
production supply 
chain) 
Analysis of 
complex socio-
technical factors 
contributing to 
outbreaks 
(emphasis on 
role played by 
organisational/ 
regulatory factors 
which contributed 
to the outbreaks 
– e.g., Trust 
management) 
Testing the 
usefulness of the 
Accimap 
approach for 
explaining how 
and why 
accidents occur 
in the outdoor 
domain (Salmon 
et al., 2010, p. 
927) 
Case study 
based on 
Mangatepopo 
Gorge Incident  
comparison of 
three methods -  
Accimap, HFACS 
and STAMP  
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Hopkins (2000) Woo and Vicente 
(2003) 
Ladkin (2005) Vicente and 
Christopherson 
(2006) 
Johnson and de 
Almeida (2008) 
Cassano-Piche et 
al. (2009) 
Waterson (2009) Salmon et al 
(2010) 
Salmon et al. 
(2012)  
Theoretical 
background 
Organisational 
Sociology; 
Findings partly 
interpreted 
through High 
Reliability 
Organisation 
(HRO) theory 
Rasmussen’s model 
of boundaries of 
acceptable and 
unacceptable 
performance 
(Rasmussen, 1997) 
Logic, computer 
science approach 
towards complex 
systems analysis 
Rasmussen’s 
model of 
boundaries of 
acceptable and 
unacceptable 
performance 
(Rasmussen, 
1997) 
Safety-critical 
systems and 
Rasmussen’s 
model of risk 
management and 
socio-technical 
failure 
(Rasmussen, 1997)
Rasmussen’s 
model of 
boundaries of 
acceptable and 
unacceptable 
performance 
(Rasmussen, 1997)
Sociotechnical 
systems theory; 
Rasmussen’s risk 
management 
framework (1997) 
Sociotechnical 
systems theory; 
Rasmussen’s risk 
management 
framework (1997) 
Sociotechnical 
systems theory; 
Rasmussen’s risk 
management 
framework (1997) 
Procedure No explicit 
mention of 
procedure 
(Hopkins, 2000, p. 
122) 
No explicit mention of 
procedure 
No explicit 
mention of 
procedure 
No explicit 
mention of 
procedure 
No explicit mention 
of procedure but 
authors discuss 
issues related to 
reliability and 
validity of their 
analyses 
No explicit mention 
of procedure, but 
coverage of how 
predictions were 
linked to aspects of 
the Accimap and 
Conflict Maps 
Two stages: (1) 
System 
description – 
mainly involving 
document 
analysis and 
coding; (2) 
System 
modelling based 
on Risk 
Management 
Framework 
(Rasmussen, 
1997) 
Two analysts 
using one of two 
methods 
(Accimap and 
Root Cause 
Analysis - RCA). 
Three additional 
researchers 
reviewed the 
outputs from the 
analysts. A 
validation review 
was conducted 
by a group of 
domain experts 
and subsequent 
Accimap and 
RCA models 
were modified. 
Three human 
factors experts 
used the three 
methods to 
analyse the 
incident and 
collectively 
reviewed their 
outputs. An 
experienced 
outdoor activity 
instructor 
reviewed the 
outcomes from 
the analysis. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Hopkins (2000) Woo and Vicente 
(2003) 
Ladkin (2005) Vicente and 
Christopherson 
(2006) 
Johnson and de 
Almeida (2008) 
Cassano-Piche et 
al. (2009) 
Waterson (2009) Salmon et al 
(2010) 
Salmon et al. 
(2012)  
Outcomes Causal diagram of 
Esso Gas Plant 
Accident (Hopkins, 
2000, p.122) 
Accimaps for each 
outbreak; timelines; 
Actormap of 
counterproductive 
interactions (Woo 
and Vicente, 2003, p. 
266) 
Comparison and 
critique of 
Hopkin’s 
Accimap ; 
Combination of 
Accimap with 
Why-Because-
Analysis (WBA) 
Accimaps for the 
outbreak; 
timeline 
Generic Actormap, 
Conflict Map and 
Accimap 
Accimaps for the 
outbreak; timeline; 
annotated ‘conflict 
map’ showing poor 
vertical integration 
during the outbreak 
Adaptations of 
the risk 
management 
framework 
covering 
contributory 
factors; cross-
level and whole 
system 
relationships. 
Accimap for the 
incident; RCA 
model (Davidson, 
2007) 
Accimap, HFACS 
(Wiegmann and 
Shappell, 2003) 
and STAMP 
(Leveson, 2004) 
models. 
Comparison 
with other 
models 
None None Comparison with 
Accimap 
None Comparison with 
STAMP (Leveson, 
2003) 
None None Comparison with 
RCA (Davidson, 
2007) 
Comparison with 
HFACS and 
STAMP 
Levels of 
analysis 
5 levels: Societal; 
Government/ 
Regulatory 
System/ 
Company/ 
Organisational/ 
Physical Accident 
Sequence 
6 levels: 
Government/ 
Regulatory 
Bodies/Local 
Government/ 
Technical and 
Operational 
Management/ 
Physical Processes 
and Actor Activities/ 
Equipment and 
Surroundings 
Not applicable 6 levels: 
Government/ 
Regulatory 
Bodies/Local 
Government/ 
Technical and 
Operational 
Management/ 
Physical 
Processes and 
Actor Activities/ 
Equipment and 
Surroundings 
6 levels: 
Government/ 
Regulatory 
Bodies/Local 
Government/ 
Technical and 
Operational 
Management/ 
Physical Processes 
and Actor 
Activities/ 
Equipment and 
Surroundings 
6 levels: 
Government/ 
Regulatory 
Bodies/Local 
Government/ 
Technical and 
Operational 
Management/ 
Physical Processes 
and Actor 
Activities/ 
Equipment and 
Surroundings 
6 levels: 
Government/ 
Regulatory / 
Trust 
Governance/ 
Hospital 
Management/ 
Clinical 
Management/ 
Equipment and 
Surroundings 
6 levels: 
Government/ 
Regulatory / 
Trust 
Governance/ 
Hospital 
Management/ 
Clinical 
Management/ 
Equipment and 
Surroundings 
6 levels: 
Government/ 
Regulatory / 
Trust 
Governance/ 
Hospital 
Management/ 
Clinical 
Management/ 
Equipment and 
Surroundings 
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Table 3: Applying the framework to the 26 studies 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Hopkins (2000) Woo and Vicente 
(2003) 
Ladkin (2005) Vicente and 
Christopherson 
(2006) 
Johnson and de 
Almeida (2008) 
Cassano-Piche et 
al. (2009) 
Waterson (2009) Salmon et al 
(2010) 
Salmon et al. 
(2012)  
Causal 
factors  
27 factors, most 
organised at the 
‘organisational’ 
level of analysis 
Walkerton – 33 
factors; 
North Battleton – 53 
factors. Mostly evenly 
distributed for both 
outbreaks 
Not applicable 33 factors 33 factors 43 factors 7 contributory 
factors; 3 
hypothesised 
cross-level 
relationships and 
3 whole system 
relationships 
42 factors 61 factors 
Changes to 
standard 
Accimap 
Small deviation 
from original 
formulation 
No major changes Not applicable No major 
changes 
Small deviation 
from original 
formulation (no 
distinction drawn 
between indirect 
and direct causes) 
No major changes; 
addition of ‘critical 
event’ factor 
Use of the Risk 
Management 
Framework and 
not standard 
Accimap format 
Small deviation 
from original 
formulation (no 
distinction drawn 
between indirect 
and direct 
causes) 
Small deviation 
from original 
formulation (no 
distinction drawn 
between indirect 
and direct 
causes) 
Other details Relatively simple 
Accimap; use of 
arrows to indicate 
cross-level 
causality 
Integration of ‘logic 
gates’ in the Accimap 
Graphical 
representation of 
WBA and 
Accimap 
Integration of 
fault trees in the 
Accimap. Attempt 
to test some of 
the ‘predictions’ 
made by 
Rasmussen’s 
(1997) Risk 
Management 
Framework 
Actormap is used 
as the basis for the 
Accimap. 
Conflictmap is used 
to illustrate inter-
relationships 
between actors, 
decisions and other 
influences leading 
up to the explosion 
Attempt to test 
some of the 
‘predictions’ made 
by Rasmussen’s 
(1997) Risk 
Management 
Framework 
Attempt to 
hypothesise 
difference causal 
relationships 
within the 
hospital. No 
identification of 
specific causal 
factors. 
Attempt to test 
some of the 
‘predictions’ 
made by 
Rasmussen’s 
(1997) Risk 
Management 
Framework; 
Comparison with 
RCA outputs 
Comparison 
between three 
methods; 
recommendation 
that Accimaps 
include a domain 
specific 
taxonomy of 
failure modes 
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Table 3: Applying the framework to the 26 studies  
 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
 Jenkins et al. (2010) Jenkins et al. (2011) Le Coze (2010) Andersson (2010) Branford (2011) Debrincat et al. (2013) Salmon et al. (2013) 
Context of 
use 
Policing - Stockwell 
(2005) shooting 
Policing - Stockwell 
(2005) shooting 
Manufacturing – Accident 
in a dynamite factory at 
Billy Berclau, France 
(2003) 
Nuclear – ‘Out-of-The 
Loop’(OOTL) 
performance problem 
in automation 
Aviation – Analysis of 
the Überlingen mid-air 
collision 
Aviation – Crash of Royal 
Australian Navy King 
Helicopter (2005) 
Rail – Accident at level 
crossing involving a 
vehicle at Kerang, 
Australia (2007) 
Goals and 
objectives 
Exploration of the 
interdependencies 
and between actions, 
omissions and 
decisions which led 
up to the shooting 
incident 
Builds on Jenkins et 
al. (2010), but focuses 
on individual factors 
(flow of alerts, 
information, goals, 
task and procedures 
(Jenkins et al. 2010, 
p. 103). 
Aim is to illustrate trends in 
safety auditing and 
accident investigation with 
an emphasis on targeting 
organisational factors (Le 
Coze, 2010, p. 80) 
Exploration of how 
Accimaps can be used 
to provide a holistic 
overview of automation 
related problems 
Demonstration of the 
(‘big picture’) benefits of 
the Accimap approach 
towards systemic 
accident analysis 
Aim is to determine which 
tools can assist with 
achieving organisational 
improvement within the 
aviation industry, particularly 
in terms of identifying and 
visualising organisational 
factors. 
Aim is to examine the 
level crossing system 
in which the accident 
took place and 
understand the actions 
of the individual truck 
driver in crossing the 
track in the presence 
of an oncoming train 
Theoretical 
background 
Sociotechnical 
systems theory; 
Rasmussen’s risk 
management 
framework (1997) 
Sociotechnical 
systems theory; 
Rasmussen’s risk 
management 
framework (1997). 
Use of a number of 
theoretical 
approaches to 
analyse the incident 
(e.g., situational 
awareness, Endsley, 
Safety engineering and 
management; human and 
social sciences 
Human factors, safety 
science 
Rasmussen’s model of 
boundaries of 
acceptable and 
unacceptable 
performance 
(Rasmussen, 1997) 
Systemic accident analysis; 
Human factors approach 
(James Reason) 
Sociotechnical 
systems theory; 
Rasmussen’s risk 
management 
framework (1997). Use 
of a number of 
theoretical approaches 
to analyse the incident 
(e.g., schema theory, 
Neisser, 1976) 
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Table 3: Applying the framework to the 26 studies  
 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
 Jenkins et al. (2010) Jenkins et al. (2011) Le Coze (2010) Andersson (2010) Branford (2011) Debrincat et al. (2013) Salmon et al. (2013) 
1995; schema theory, 
Neisser, 1976, 
decision-ladder, 
Rasmussen, 1974) 
Procedure One human factors 
practitioner (lead 
author) carried out 
the analysis, co-
authors (3) checked 
and validated the 
analysis 
Lead author 
generated the models, 
these were then 
validated by the 4 co-
authors 
No explicit procedure 
described for the Accimap, 
but steps in the analysis of 
the accident described 
(e.g., building up detailed 
chronology, identifying 
barriers, investigating 
business environment) 
No explicit mention of 
procedure 
No explicit procedure 
described for the 
Accimap 
No explicit procedure 
described for the Accimap 
Three human factors 
experts initially 
discussed the findings 
from the investigation 
report; one expert 
build the Accimap and 
two others reviewed 
the results; the 
Accimap was refined 
through discussion 
and reviewed by two 
rail safety practitioners 
and the lead 
investigator from the 
official investigation 
team 
Outcomes Accimap for the 
incident, ‘time 
stamped’ and coded 
according to time 
phase, causal 
relationships and 
‘weak’ causal links 
As Jenkins et al. 
(2011), but with 
additional analysis 
based on schema 
theory, decision 
ladders 
Accimap of the accident Accimap describing the 
factors influencing 
OOTL performance 
during use of an 
automatic turbine 
system in a nuclear 
plant 
Accimap of the accident Accimap of the accident and 
development of hybrid model 
based on Reason’s (1990) 
Swiss Cheese model  
 Accimap for the 
accident with 
additional analyses 
applying Schema 
theory (Neisser 
perceptual cycle – 
Neisser, 1976) in 
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Table 3: Applying the framework to the 26 studies  
 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
 Jenkins et al. (2010) Jenkins et al. (2011) Le Coze (2010) Andersson (2010) Branford (2011) Debrincat et al. (2013) Salmon et al. (2013) 
order to account for 
the truck driver’s 
behaviour 
Comparison 
with other 
models 
None None None None None Comparison with Swiss 
Cheese Model 
None 
Levels of 
analysis 
6 levels: 
Government Policy 
and 
Budgeting/Regulatory 
Bodies and 
associations/Local 
Area Government, 
Planning and 
Budgeting, Company 
Management 
(strategic 
command)/Technical 
and Operational 
management 
(Tactical Command)/ 
Physical Processes 
and Actor Activities/ 
Equipment and 
As Jenkins et al. 
(2011) 
6 levels: 
Society, 
market/Government 
regulatory system/ 
Company/ Site 
management/ Operational 
management/Shop floor 
and installations 
4 levels: Company 
management/Technical 
and operational 
management/ Physical 
Processes and 
operator activities/ 
Equipment and 
Surroundings 
4 levels: 
External/Organisational/ 
Physical and Actor 
Events, Processes and 
Conditions 
No explicit mention of levels 
of analysis 
6 levels: 
Government/ 
Regulatory / Trust 
Governance/ Hospital 
Management/ Clinical 
Management/ 
Equipment and 
Surroundings 
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 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
 Jenkins et al. (2010) Jenkins et al. (2011) Le Coze (2010) Andersson (2010) Branford (2011) Debrincat et al. (2013) Salmon et al. (2013) 
Surroundings  
 43 factors As Jenkins et al. 
(2011) 
36 factors 21 factors 29 factors 26 factors 36 factors 
Changes to 
standard 
Accimap 
Addition of ‘time 
stamp’ and coding 
according to time 
phase, causal 
relationships and 
‘weak’ causal links 
As Jenkins et al. 
(2011) 
Labels covering the levels 
of analysis within the 
overall system changed 
Annotation of Accimap 
with ‘paths’ which 
describe factors likely 
to contribute to OOTL 
problems 
Simplification of system 
levels (4 as compared 
to standard 6), shading 
used to highlight the 
role played by the air 
traffic controller in the 
accident and the 
influences within the 
overall system upon 
their actions and 
decisions 
No explicit labelling of system 
levels of analysis; Accimap 
simplified with causal 
connection numbered ; levels 
(e.g., safety culture, working 
environment) distributed 
across the Accimap 
No major changes to 
the standard format 
Other details Attempt to test some 
of the ‘predictions’ 
made by 
Rasmussen’s (1997) 
Risk Management 
Framework; Use of 
Accimap used as a 
basis for further 
application of theory in 
order to understand 
the decision-making 
process of individuals 
Study places emphasis on 
the role played by changes 
within the history of the 
company and how this 
ultimately shaped the 
course of the accident 
Accimap is partly used 
to identify function 
allocation problems 
and assess likelihood 
of occurrence of 
cognitive error (e.g., 
Accimap is partly used 
to illustrate the 
influence of the broad 
sociotechnical context 
in aviation safety 
Accimap records casual 
factors across the whole of 
the system; deviates from 
standard format and had a 
‘freeform’ structure 
Additional analysis 
using schema theory 
in order to embellish 
the systems analysis 
with an individual, 
psychological account 
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 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
 Jenkins et al. (2010) Jenkins et al. (2011) Le Coze (2010) Andersson (2010) Branford (2011) Debrincat et al. (2013) Salmon et al. (2013) 
decision-ladders 
(Rasmussen, 1974) 
to depict allocation of 
function between 
personnel resources 
during the shooting 
during the incident divided attention) of the accident 
 
  
55 
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 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
 Underwood and Waterson (2014) 
Scott-Parker et al. 
(2014) 
Lei et al. (2014) Trotter et al. (2014) Harvey and 
Stanton (2014) 
Salmon et al. (2014) Tabinzadeh and 
Meshkati (2015) 
Fan et al. (2015) 
Context of 
use 
Transport (Rail) – 
Grayrigg (UK) 
accident involving 
train derailment 
(2007)  
Transport (Road) – 
accidents involving 
young drivers 
Aviation – crash of 
flight demonstrator 
(China - February 
2009) and unmanned 
aircraft (US 0 April 
2006) 
Outdoor Recreation and 
Space Flight – 
Mangatepopo Gorge 
Incident (2008) – Apollo 
13LM Consumables 
Incident (April, 1970) 
Aviation (Military) – 
Hawk Jet Missile 
Simulation 
Emergency Response  
(Fire) - Murrindindi 
Bushfire (February, 
2009) 
Oil and Gas – BP 
Deepwater Horizon 
blowout (2010) 
 
Civil Engineering – 
Yangmingtan Bridge 
Collapse (August, 
2012) 
Goals and 
objectives 
 
Comparison 
between three 
difference accident 
analysis models 
(Accimap, STAMP, 
and Australian 
Transport Safety 
Bureau model – 
ATSB) 
Use of Accimaps to 
demonstrate the 
value of applying as 
systems approach to 
the causes of 
accidents involving 
young drivers 
Development of 
‘AcciTree’ – the main 
being to combine the 
graphical 
representation 
available within an 
Accimap with the 
error taxonomy 
available in HFACS 
Examination of systems 
related factors in the form 
of ‘Impromaps’ which 
were involved in 
improvisation incidents 
leading to positive and 
negative accident 
outcomes 
Use of case study 
to demonstrate and 
illustrate a set of 
core challenges for 
real-world systems-
of-systems 
Testing the usefulness 
of the Accimap 
approach for examining 
the systemic 
characteristics of 
disaster response 
Analysis of main 
contributing causes 
of system failure and 
interactions of key 
decision-makers and 
stakeholders 
Analysis of system 
wide failures leading 
up to bridge collapse 
Theoretical 
background 
 
Safety Science; 
Human Factors and 
Ergonomics 
Sociotechnical 
systems theory; 
Rasmussen’s risk 
management 
framework (1997) 
Safety Science; 
Human Factors and 
Ergonomics 
Sociotechnical systems 
theory; Rasmussen’s risk 
management framework 
(1997) 
Safety science; 
human factors and 
ergonomics 
Sociotechnical systems 
theory; Rasmussen’s 
risk management 
framework (1997) 
Safety Science; 
Sociotechnical 
systems theory; 
Rasmussen’s risk 
management 
framework (1997) 
Engineering; 
Rasmussen’s risk 
management 
framework (1997) 
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Table 3: Applying the framework to the 26 studies  
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
 Underwood and Waterson (2014) 
Scott-Parker et al. 
(2014) 
Lei et al. (2014) Trotter et al. (2014) Harvey and 
Stanton (2014) 
Salmon et al. (2014) Tabinzadeh and 
Meshkati (2015) 
Fan et al. (2015) 
Procedure 
 
Procedure followed 
the outline guidance 
provided by 
Svedung and 
Rasmussen, (2002). 
Coding using 
qualitative data 
software of accident 
investigation report: 
(1) Topography of 
the accident scene; 
(2) decision./actions 
taken by actors; (3) 
direct/indirect causal 
consequence; and, 
(4) preconditions 
requiring no further 
evaluation 
No explicit details No explicit details One human factors 
expert competed the 
analysis, a second expert 
checked it and reviewed 
the ‘Impromaps’ 
No explicit details 2 human factors 
experts generated the 
Accimap; Accimap was 
then validated by three 
subject matter experts 
No explicit details Coding using 
qualitative software 
based on multimedia 
sources (newspaper 
reports, we-based 
materials, videos – 
no official report 
available) 
Outcomes 
 
Accimap of the 
accident 
Actormap; 
Accimap (causal 
factors); 
Accimap 
(countermeasures)  
AcciTree models of 
both accidents 
Impromaps for both 
incidents 
Accimap of the 
subsystems 
involved with the 
Hawk Jet Missile 
System-of-Systems 
(SoS) 
Accimap of bushfire Accimap of the 
Deepwater Horizon 
blowout 
Accimap of the 
Yangmingtan Bridge 
Collapse 
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Table 3: Applying the framework to the 26 studies  
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
 Underwood and Waterson (2014) 
Scott-Parker et al. 
(2014) 
Lei et al. (2014) Trotter et al. (2014) Harvey and 
Stanton (2014) 
Salmon et al. (2014) Tabinzadeh and 
Meshkati (2015) 
Fan et al. (2015) 
Comparison 
with other 
models 
 
Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau 
(ATSB) model, and 
STAMP (Leveson, 
2003) 
None HFACS, SHEL 
(Edwards, 1988) 
None None None None None 
Levels of 
analysis 
 
6 levels: 
Government/ 
Regulatory 
Bodies/Local 
Government/ 
Technical and 
Operational 
Management/ 
Physical Processes 
and Actor Activities/ 
Equipment and 
Surroundings 
6 levels: 
Government/ 
Regulatory 
Bodies/Local 
Government/ 
Technical and 
Operational 
Management/ 
Physical Processes 
and Actor Activities/ 
Equipment and 
Surroundings 
No applicable 6 levels: 
Government/ Regulatory 
Bodies/Local 
Government/ 
Technical and 
Operational 
Management/ 
Physical Processes and 
Actor Activities/ 
Equipment and 
Surroundings 
6 levels: 
Government/ 
Regulatory 
Bodies/Local 
Government/ 
Technical and 
Operational 
Management/ 
Physical Processes 
and Actor 
Activities/ 
Equipment and 
Surroundings 
6 levels: 
Government/ 
Regulatory 
Bodies/Local 
Government/ 
Technical and 
Operational 
Management/ 
Physical Processes 
and Actor Activities/ 
Equipment and 
Surroundings 
6 levels: 
Government/ 
Regulatory 
Bodies/Local 
Government/ 
Technical and 
Operational 
Management/ 
Physical Processes 
and Actor Activities/ 
Equipment and 
Surroundings 
6 levels: 
Government/ 
Regulatory Agencies 
and 
Associations/Compa
ny/ 
Management/Staff/ 
Physical Accident  
Sequence 
Causal 
factors  
63 factors Actormap – 38 actor 
Accimap (causal 
factors) – 36 factors 
Accimap 
(countermeasures) – 
6 factors 
Not applicable Mangatepopo Gorge 
Incident – 35 factors 
Apollo 13LM Incident – 
64 factors 
16 factors 71 factors 66 factors 21 factors 
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Table 3: Applying the framework to the 26 studies  
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
 Underwood and Waterson (2014) 
Scott-Parker et al. 
(2014) 
Lei et al. (2014) Trotter et al. (2014) Harvey and 
Stanton (2014) 
Salmon et al. (2014) Tabinzadeh and 
Meshkati (2015) 
Fan et al. (2015) 
Changes to 
standard 
Accimap 
 
Addition of colour 
coding for factors 
None New ‘hybrid’ model – 
AcciTree (Accimap + 
HFACS) 
Addition of categories 
covering causal factors 
within one pf the 
Impromaps (e.g., factors 
such as experience, 
organisational culture) 
Annotation of SoS 
aspects of the 
Hawk Missile 
System  
None None Focus on company 
failures 
Other details - Use of Accimap to 
organise previous 
research findings 
from the literature on 
young drivers and 
accidents, alongside 
details of possible 
countermeasures 
which could be used 
to reduce accidents 
in this target group 
Argument that the 
reliability of the 
original Accimap 
format is improved 
with AcciTrees (due 
to inclusion of 
HFACS taxonomy) 
Modification of Accimap 
to cover improvisation 
incidents 
- Test of the applicability 
of the Accimap 
approach within 
emergency response  
- - 
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 25 26 
 Newman and Goode (2015) Stefanova et al (2015) 
Context of 
use 
Transport (Road) – Crashes 
involving road freight vehicles 
Transport (Rail) – Pedestrian 
safety at level crossings 
Goals and 
objectives 
 
Analyse the complex system 
of contributory factors involved 
in road freight transportation 
Use of Accimap to illustrate the 
workings of a systems-based 
framework for understanding 
the cognitive, motivational and 
wider systemic factors 
contributing to unsafe 
behaviour at level crossings  
Theoretical 
background 
 
Sociotechnical systems 
theory; Rasmussen’s risk 
management framework 
(1997) 
Sociotechnical systems theory; 
Rasmussen’s risk management 
framework (1997) 
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 25 26 
 Newman and Goode (2015) Stefanova et al (2015) 
Procedure 
 
Five stages involving 
qualitative coding – three 
analysts: (1) identifying 
contributory factors and 
relationships between them; 
(2) factors were then 
aggregated using thematic 
analysis – Braun and Clarke , 
2006); (3) two researchers 
reviewed the coding template; 
and, (5) two research 
independently classified the 
themes according to the 
Accimap framework and 
resolved disagreements 
No explicit details 
Outcomes 
 
Aggregate Accimap of 
contributory factors leading to 
road freight transportation 
crashes and inter-relationships 
between the factors  
Two Accimaps: (1) illustration 
of crossing context where a 
pedestrian commits a violation 
on their way home after 
shopping; (2) illustration of 
crossing context where a 
pedestrian receives a fine for a 
violation on their way to work. 
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 25 26 
 Newman and Goode (2015) Stefanova et al (2015) 
Comparison 
with other 
models 
 
None None 
Levels of 
analysis 
 
 
6 levels: 
Government bodies/ 
Regulatory Bodies/Other 
organisations and clients/ 
Heavy vehicle companies/ 
Drivers and other actors at the 
scene of the incident/ 
Equipment, surroundings and 
meteorological conditions 
6 levels: 
Government/ Regulatory 
Bodies/Local Government/ 
Technical and Operational 
Management/ 
Pedestrian level/ 
Equipment and Surroundings 
Causal 
factors 
60 factors Accimap 1 (19 factors), 
Accimap 2 (20 factors) 
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 25 26 
 Newman and Goode (2015) Stefanova et al (2015) 
Changes to 
standard 
Accimap 
 
Addition of different levels of 
analysis 
Replacement of ‘Physical 
Processes and Actor Activities’ 
with Pedestrian level’  
Other details Attempt to test some of the 
‘predictions’ made by 
Rasmussen’s (1997) Risk 
Management Framework 
Accimaps used to provide 
support for a new framework  
  
Table 4: Requirements for methods for accident investigation and analysis 
(Ryan, 2015, p. 827, based on Katsakiori et al., 2009; Sklet, 2004; and, 
Wagenaar and van der Schrier, 1997) 
 
An accident analysis method should 
1. Have a clear scope for analysis (e.g., whether it should focus at the level of 
the work and the technological system, or more broadly at influences from 
government and regulators) 
2. Be influenced by a model or group of models 
3. Provided a detailed description of the accident, including a visual 
representation of the accident sequence if appropriate  
4. Search for and reveal underlying causes 
5. Contribute to understanding of prevention (e.g., safety barriers) 
6. Help in generating recommendations 
7. Give consideration to practical aspects, such as level of education and 
training that is needed to use the method 
8. Be valid and reliable 
 
